Abstract. Fair exchange turns out to be an increasingly important t o p i c due to the rapid growth of electronic commerce. An exchange is deemed to be fair if at the end of exchange, either each party receives the expected item or neither party receives any useful information about the other's item. Several protocols for fair exchange have been proposed in recent years. In this paper, we rst examine a newly published fair exchange protocol and point out its aws and weaknesses. We then put forward a more e cient and secure protocol and give an informal analysis.
Introduction
Due to the rapid growth of electronic commerce nowadays, a related security issue on the fair exchange of electronic data between two parties over computer networks is of more and more importance. We can nd various exchange instances in di erent t ypes of commercial activity 2]: { In contract signing, two parties exchange their non-repudiable commitment to the contract text.
{ In purchasing, a payment i s e x c hanged for a valuable item. { In certi ed mail, a message is exchanged for an acknowledgement of receipt.
An exchange is fair if at the end of exchange, either each party receives the expected item or neither party receives any useful information about the other's item.
In electronic commerce scenarios, exchanges have to be carried over insecure networks and transacting parties may not trust each other. There could be subsequent disputes about what was exchanged during a transaction even if the exchange itself was completed fairly. I n this case, evidence should be accumulated during the exchange to enable the settlement o f a n y future disputes.
{ Gradual exchange protocols 4{6, 8, 12, 13] where two parties gradually disclose the expected items by m a n y steps. { Third party protocols 1{3, 7, 9, 11, 14, 15] which make use of an on-line or o -line (trusted) third party. The gradual exchange solutions may h a ve theoretical value but seem to be too cumbersome for actual implementation because of the high communication overhead. Hence, recent research mainly focuses on the third party solutions.
As the use of (trusted) third party TTP in fair exchange may cause the bottleneck problem, it is desirable to minimize the TTP's involvement when designing e cient fair exchange protocols. Such an attempt has been made in 14] , where the TTP acts as a notary rather than a delivery authority. H o wever, the TTP still needs to be involved in each protocol run, though this might be necessary in some applications 15].
The TTP's involvement is further reduced in 1, 3, 15] , where transacting parties are willing to resolve c o m m unications problems between themselves and turn to the TTP only as a last recourse. However, only the risk-taking party (originator) is allowed to invoke t h e TTP, the responder may not know the nal state of exchange in time. If a short time limit is imposed on a protocol run, the originator may not be quick enough to invoke t h e TTP for recovery thus the fairness will be destroyed.
Asokan, Shoup and Waidner proposed a generic fair exchange protocol in 2] which uses the TTP only in the case of exceptions and tolerates temporary failures in the communication channels to the TTP. In addition, it allows either party to unilaterally bring a protocol run to completion without losing fairness.
In this paper, we examine an instantiation of their generic fair exchange protocol for certi ed mail and put forward proposals for improvement. The following general notation is used throughout the paper.
X Y: concatenation of two messages X and Y . H(X): a one-way hash function applied to message X. eK(X) and dK(X) : encryption and decryption of message X with key K. sS A (X): principal A's digital signature on message X with the private key S A . The algorithm is assumed to be a`signature with appendix', and the message is not recoverable from the signature.
A ! B : X: principal A dispatches message X addressed to principal B.
ASW Protocol
A protocol for certi ed mail was proposed in 2] (see Figure 4 in the original paper). In this section, we give a brief description of the protocol, which is referred to as ASW protocol herein.
In certi ed mail, a sender O wants to send a mail message M to a receiver R. The sender O requires that the receiver R not be able to deny receiving the message M. To achieve this, O needs a non-repudiation of receipt token from R in exchange for the message M. T h us certi ed mail is a fair exchange of the message and its non-repudiation of receipt token.
ASW protocol has three sub-protocols: exchange, abort, a n d resolve. In the normal case, only the exchange sub-protocol is executed. The other two subprotocols are used only if O or R presumes that something has gone wrong and decides to forcibly complete a protocol run. This is an indeterminate choice made locally by O or R without losing fairness. A (trusted) third party TTP will be invoked in the abort and resolve sub-protocols. It is assumed that communication channels between any t wo parties are con dential. It is further assumed that the communication channels between the TTP and each transacting party ( O and R) are resilient, i.e. messages inserted into a resilient c hannel will eventually be delivered.
The notation below is used in the description of ASW protocol. The resolve R sub-protocol is as follows. In the exchange sub-protocol, if R decides to give up before sending me2, it can simply terminate the protocol run without losing fairness. If O decides to give up after sending me1 (usually because O does not receive me2 within a reasonable time), it invokes the TTP by running the abort sub-protocol. If R decides to give up after sending me2 ( t ypically because R does not receive me3 in time), it invokes the TTP by running the resolve R sub-protocol. If O decides to give up after sending me3 ( t ypically because O does not receive me4 in time), it invokes the TTP by running the resolve O sub-protocol.
The abort sub-protocol is used by O to abort the protocol so that the TTP will not resolve the protocol at a later time. The resolve O and resolve R subprotocols are used by O and R respectively to force a successful termination.
Clearly, o n l y one of the abort or resolve sub-protocols can succeed for a given instance of exchange. On the TTP's system, each of the abort and resolve subprotocol is guaranteed to be atomic.
In ASW protocol, either a tuple (me1 m e 2 k e y R ) o r a n a davit token serves as a valid receipt for a mail message. Remark 1. The abort sub-protocol is awed.
The abort sub-protocol is initiated by O, usually because O does not receive me2 in time. If R has already resolved the protocol, O is asked to initiate the resolve O sub-protocol 1 . However, O is unable to initiate the resolve O subprotocol without me2. Thus O has neither an abort token nor an a davit token at the end of a protocol run while R has received the mail message.
In addition, O may misbehave by initiating the abort sub-protocol after it has initiated the resolve O sub-protocol and obtained an a davit token. I f t h e TTP sends an abort token to O in this case, the TTP will be in a dilemma when R initiates the resolve R sub-protocol later.
These problems also exist in their generic protocol for fair exchange. A xed abort sub-protocol is as follows. O need not send M and key O to the TTP in the resolve O sub-protocol. With me1 a n d me2, it is su cient for the TTP to issue the a davit token. I f R resolves the protocol later, the TTP can obtain M by decrypting C contained in me1.
key O was used in ASW protocol as a part of non-repudiation of origin token. In fact, me1 is already a complete non-repudiation of origin token. Hence, key O can be omitted from all sub-protocols.
Remark 3. The protocol performance may degrade when transmitting large mail messages.
The exchange sub-protocol may become less e cient when the mail message is large since a mail message needs to be transmitted twice, that is cipher text C in me1 and plain text M in me3. The communication overheads will increase even more when the abort or resolve sub-protocols are invoked. 1 Actually, R can initiate the resolve R sub-protocol before sending me2 t o O.
It is also a burden to the TTP to deal with the whole mail messages when the abort or resolve sub-protocols are invoked. The TTP needs a large space to store those mail messages and tokens safely until both parties have retrieved the expected items.
Remark 4. The privacy of mail messages may not be well protected.
As we just mentioned, if the abort or resolve sub-protocols are invoked, the content of a mail message has to be disclosed to the TTP. Such a situation may be undesirable to the parties who want to exchange mail messages secretly between themselves.
Although it is possible to encrypt the mail message either with a key shared between two parties or with the receiver's public encryption key before exchange, this will make the dispute resolution more complicated. If there is no evidence to prove w h a t k ey is used and the times of encryption performed, the content o f a mail message will be in dispute.
Remark 5. The encrypted data in the non-repudiation of receipt token may not be publicly veri able, which makes the dispute resolution ine cient. That means the TTP may n e e d t o b e on-line for dispute resolution. If the TTP is temporary unavailable, arbitration has to be postponed. If the TTP's private key has lost when a dispute arises, the arbitrator cannot make a proper conclusion. 2 If the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem 10] is used, the encrypted message cannot beveri ed even with the plain message and the public key unless the random seed for ElGamal encryption is also provided. But the random seed is usually not saved after encryption.
The above problems may not be fatal to ASW protocol, but could a ect its e ciency and security.
A Variant Protocol
Here we p r e s e n t a more e cient and secure protocol for certi ed mail, mainly based on the ideas from 2, 14]. We split the de nition of a mail message M into two parts, a commitment C and a key K. In the normal case, the originator O sends (C K) ( Like ASW protocol, our protocol has three sub-protocols: exchange, abort, a n d resolve. W e also assume that the communication channels between the TTP and each transacting party ( O and R) a r e resilient. In addition, we assume that the communication channel between O and R is con dential if the two parties want to exchange mail messages secretly. T h e exchange sub-protocol is as follows. If the exchange sub-protocol is executed successfully, R will receive C and K and thus M = dK(C) together with non-repudiation of origin tokens (EOO C, EOO K). Meanwhile, O will receive non-repudiation of receipt tokens (EOR C, EOR K).
R can simply quit the transaction without losing fairness before sending EOR C to O. Otherwise, R has to run the resolve sub-protocol to force a successful termination. Similarly, O can run the abort sub-protocol to quit the transaction without losing fairness before sending EOO K to R. Otherwise, O has to run the resolve sub-protocol to force a successful termination.
The resolve sub-protocol can be initiated either by O or by R. When the TTP receives such a request, the TTP will rst check the status of a transaction identi ed by ( O R L) uniquely. If the transaction has been aborted by O, t h e TTP will return the abort token. If the transaction has already been resolved, the TTP will deliver the tuple (f 2 f 6 O R L K con K EOR C) to the current initiator of the resolve sub-protocol. Otherwise, the TTP will { decrypt eP T T P (K) a n d v erify with sub K that K is submitted by O { check that EOR C is consistent w i t h sub K in terms of L and EOO C { generate evidence con K { deliver the tuple (f 2 f 6 O R L K con K EOR C) to the current initiator { set the status of the transaction resolved.
The third component in the tuple indicates the key supplier, which is authenticated by sub K and notarised in con K. Hence, intruders cannot mount a denialof-service attack b y sending bogus keys to the TTP for con rmation. Evidence con K c a n b e u s e d t o p r o ve t h a t { a transaction identi ed by ( O R L) has been resolved successfully, { the message key K originated from O, a n d { the message key K is available from the TTP by request.
In comparison with ASW protocol, our protocol has the following merits.
{ The TTP's overhead will not increase when transmitting large mail messages. { The content of a mail message need not be disclosed to any outsiders including the TTP. { The evidence is publicly veri able without any restrictions on the types of signature and encryption algorithms. Therefore, our protocol is more e cient and secure than ASW protocol both at the stage of exchange and at the stage of dispute resolution.
Security Analysis
We analyse our protocol with respect to the requirements listed in Section 3. { O did not receive a n y message from R after sending message 1 in the exchange sub-protocol. In this case, O can initiate the abort sub-protocol, which is guaranteed to be completed within a nite period under the assumption. If R has not resolved the protocol, the TTP will not resolve the protocol at a later time, thus R cannot obtain K, w h i c h means R cannot receive M. I f R has already resolved the protocol, O will obtain EOR C and con K from the TTP, w h i c h can be used to prove t h a t R received M.
{ O did not receive EOR K after sending message 3 in the exchange subprotocol. In this case, O can initiate the resolve sub-protocol to obtain con K from the TTP, which can be used in place of EOR K to prove t h a t R received (or is able to receive) K provided the assumption holds.
The only possible unfair situation that R may face is that R did not receive K and EOO K after sending message 2 in the exchange sub-protocol. In this case, R can initiate the resolve sub-protocol to obtain K and con K under the same assumption. Proof: We rst look at the possible ways that O can conclude a protocol run.
{ terminating normally after sending message 4 in the exchange sub-protocol { invoking the abort sub-protocol at any time before sending message 3 in the exchange sub-protocol { invoking the resolve sub-protocol at any time after receiving message 2 in the exchange sub-protocol.
As we assume that the communication channel between the TTP and O is resilient, the abort and resolve sub-protocols initiated by O are guaranteed to be completed within a nite period. Thus at any time, there is always a way f o r O to conclude the protocol run.
On the other hand, the possible ways that R can conclude a protocol run are { terminating normally after receiving message 4 in the exchange sub-protocol { simply quitting at any time before sending message 2 in the exchange subprotocol { invoking the resolve sub-protocol at any time after receiving message 1 in the exchange sub-protocol. Again, each of these will result in the timely conclusion of the protocol run for R. In the same way, EOR C proves that R received C with label L from O while EOR K proves that R received K with label L from O. T h us (EOR C, EOR K) proves that R received M = dK(C).
Alternatively, con K proves that the TTP notarised K with label L at O's request, and that R received (or is able to receive) K with label L from the TTP under the assumption of a resilient c hannel with the TTP. T h us con K can be used with EOO C and EOR C to prove the origin and receipt of M.
Claim 5. If the communication channels between the TTP and each transacting party (O and R) a r e r esilient, and that the TTP can be f o r ced to eventually send a valid response to any request sent to it, the TTP is veri able.
Proof: Under the assumptions, the TTP's possible misbehavior could be { R receives the abort token while O receives con K { R receives K and con K while O receives the abort token.
In the rst case, if O uses EOR C and con K to prove t h a t R received M, R can use the abort token to prove the TTP's misbehavior.
In the second case, if R uses EOO C and con K to prove that O sent M to R, O can use the abort token to prove t h e TTP's misbehavior. It should be noted that if R uses EOO C and EOO K to prove t h a t O sent M to R, O cannot use the abort token to prove the TTP's misbehavior since the TTP did not issue con icting evidence.
Conclusion
We i n vestigated ASW protocol and found out the following weaknesses besides some minor aws being xed. { The performance may degrade when transmitting large mail messages. { The privacy of mail messages may n o t b e w ell protected. { The TTP may need to be on-line for dispute resolution.
We proposed a variant protocol which o vercomes the above w eaknesses. The security analysis shows that our protocol meets the requirements for fair exchange.
